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Recently at a major German corporation: A delegation of 
Chinese business leaders is visiting to learn more about 
high tech, Industry 4.0, automobiles and soccer. It’s an 
illustrious group. Each of the guests has a “dishwasher-
to-billionaire” biography that could easily be made into a 
feature film. One participant founded a fashion empire, 
another a bank. One launched a chain of grocery stores, 
another builds electricity grids and railways in Africa. A 
number made their fortunes with construction compa-
nies, others with technology firms or Internet portals. All 
have won big during China’s “economic miracle” and are 
now standard bearers for it.      
 Yet when asked about China’s economy, the entrepre-
neurs do not hide the fact that miracles are not what they 
are currently concerned with. China’s stalled growth, its 
jittery stock markets and the restructuring of its state ap-
paratus (a diplomatic circumlocution for the current anti-
corruption campaign) are all causing uncertainty, they 
say, especially for the business community. “These are 
difficult times,” one explains, concisely describing the 
general mood. “The situation is very volatile and we can 
only hope that at some point it will improve.” It is not the 
type of assessment likely to attract foreign investors, yet 
this group has not come all this way looking for money, 
more to find opportunities for investing their own wealth 
in Germany.
 Even China’s traditionally optimistic business elite 
is now voicing skepticism, something which confirms a 
sentiment that has been apparent for quite some time in 
conversations with international managers, diplomats and 
China analysts: The People’s Republic is undergoing far-
reaching economic and political change, and how it will 
all play out – for China and for the world – is anything but 
clear. That doesn’t mean everything will grind to a halt in 
China. It means many things are not going as well as they 
should. Neither are they going as well as many people 
think they could, nor as well as they undoubtedly must if 
China is to overcome the challenges it faces.
 Some experts are calling it a crisis. The Chinese 
government is talking about a transition to a “new nor-
A China whose economy is growing at a slower pace is something the world 
can cope with. But a China with doubts about whether the government can 
maintain control and implement reform – that would be a serious problem. 
The signals currently coming from the economic and political spheres are cause 
for concern. China is in danger of falling into a downward spiral of declining 
confidence. What are the consequences for Germany?
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actual policy decisions and their implementation, but on 
something far more ethereal: confidence and trust. A Chi-
na whose economy is growing more slowly is something 
the world can cope with. But a China with doubts about 
whether the government can maintain control and imple-
ment reform – that would be a serious problem. 
Hard landing or smart landing?
The fact that uncertainty in China can roil the waters 
worldwide shows how important the People’s Republic is 
for the global economy, especially for export-driven Ger-
many (see box and graphic). China is the fourth largest 
buyer of German goods. Exports to the People’s Republic 
account for about 2 percent of Germany’s gross domestic 
product. Yet China plays a far greater role for many indi-
vidual companies. In 2014, DAX members made over 13 
percent of their global sales in China, or 132 billion in to-
tal. The largest share went to the automotive sector. The 
People’s Republic accounts for one-third of Volkswagen’s 
sales; at BMW it’s almost 20 percent, at Daimler 10 per-
cent. A slowing Chinese economy will therefore make it-
self felt on their balance sheets, and on those of hundreds 
of other German companies. 
 It’s not a surprise that China’s economy is now weake-
ning after some three decades of two-digit growth; rather, 
it’s a development that many have been predicting for 
years – first and foremost, the Chinese government. Less 
growth is even desirable if unhealthy growth disappears, 
leaving its healthy counterpart. After all, the development 
model used in China until now – one based on exports and 
massive investment in factories, infrastructure and urban 
development – has not only brought the country prosperi-
ty unlike any it has previously seen, it has also been the 
cause of disastrous pollution, rampant corruption, massi-
ve overcapacity and greater inequality. To prevent China 
from “becoming poor again before it’s able to become rich,” 
as many Chinese fear, the country must, in the future, do 
business in a way that is more environmentally friendly, 
more innovative and more socially responsible.  
mal” with growth that, while slower, is also healthier and 
more equitably distributed. “New normal” makes it sound 
as if everything was normal and will remain so – just in a 
different way. Yet what is normal in China these days tends 
to be a concern about whether the transition to a more sus-
tainable economic model will succeed, or if China will get 
stuck in a “middle income trap” as did the once booming 
economies of Brazil, Argentina, Thailand and Malaysia.
 There are numerous disturbing symptoms. In recent 
months the business community has been unsettled by 
lower growth, the stock market crash, the country’s cur-
rency policy, falling real estate prices and rising debt. A 
number of political factors have added to the uncertain-
ty, including the opaque anti-corruption campaign, the 
conflict over the islands in the South China Sea, ethnic 
unrest, Beijing’s response to the explosion in Tianjin and 
the nationalistically laden personality cult surrounding 
President Xi Jinping.
 Uncertainty, of course, is hardly the same as collap-
se. And some of the news is undeniably good. At 6.9 per-
cent, China’s growth rate remains impressive (and would 
still be so, even if China’s statisticians did not massage 
the numbers, as many analysts suspect). The shift from 
one-child-policy to a two-child policy has demonstrated 
Beijing’s resolve to make important decisions. Chinese 
companies, such as telecom equipment provider Huawei 
and construction machine manufacturer Sany, are incre-
asingly being seen as serious competitors on the global 
market. When they travel abroad, China’s politicians are 
getting the red-carpet treatment more than ever before. 
The meeting of President Xi with Taiwan’s President Ma 
Ying-jeou has been a major diplomatic success for Beijing. 
 Yet the era when China guaranteed global stability (a 
role largely ascribed to the country in light of its immu-
nity to the Asia crisis of 1997/98 and the financial crisis 
of 2008/2009) is now over. China has lost its aura of 
relentless success, a development that is undoubtedly 
dangerous, since how the country makes it through the 
transition phase of the coming years depends not only on 
3nagement of financial markets, whether it is relations 
with international firms or neighboring countries, China 
is currently sending signals that are generating more 
uncertainty than trust.
 The anti-corruption campaign has been Xi’s flagship 
issue since he took office. At the latest since June, when 
Zhou Yongkang, China’s former security chief, was sen-
tenced to life in prison, no one in China can rely on their 
status or connections to protect them from anti-corrupti-
on investigators. The battle against abuses of power has 
given President Xi more standing within the party and 
greater popularity among the public than any Chinese ru-
ler has had since Deng Xiaoping. Whether Xi has impro-
ved governance structures in addition to his own position 
is questionable at best, since the fight against corruption 
is clearly following the script for a political campaign who-
se goal is the elimination of internal opponents.     
 Until now, there has been no attendant increase in 
rule of law or transparency. On the contrary, in a concer-
ted effort last summer the authorities arrested 280 civil 
rights lawyers who had represented victims of corrupti-
on. Controls on the media and Internet were also incre-
ased. Presumably very few Chinese are aware of these 
events in their daily lives (if such an assertion can even 
be made about a country in which independent opinion 
polls do not exist). At the same time, crises such as the 
Tianjin explosion and the regularly occurring food scan-
dals show that, when it comes down to it, many Chinese 
have little confidence in the system.     
 The state suffered its most apparent loss of confidence 
last summer when share prices collapsed. The Shanghai 
stock exchange lost 40 percent of its value within a few 
days. Some $5 trillion in wealth was obliterated, accor-
ding to financial news agency Bloomberg. What also was 
obliterated was the expectation, endorsed at the highest 
levels, that the regulatory authorities had the stock mar-
kets under control and could prevent volatility of the kind 
found on western markets. That was the implicit promi-
se used by the state for years to attract small investors to 
 China, however, has been waiting for that future for a 
long time. Xi Jinping’s predecessor Hu Jintao called China’s 
course “unbalanced and unsustainable” – thereby para-
phrasing his own predecessor. Yet no one to date has made 
such a mission of restructuring the country’s development 
model as Xi. When he presented his plans for reform in 
November 2013, he was widely praised, both at home and 
abroad. Many felt that in economic terms Xi was guiding 
the country in the right direction: toward a more self-re-
gulating market, more competition, increased innovation 
and greater integration into the global economy. The hope 
was that instead of a hard landing, China would manage 
a smart landing.
Unsettling signals
That optimism was based on confidence in the Commu-
nist Party, in keeping with the oft-quoted maxim that what-
ever China sets out to achieve, it will (although someti-
mes only by using extreme means). Xi’s reform agenda 
is, however, an ambitious undertaking, even under the 
best of conditions. Transitioning to a new development 
model in which prosperity is more equally distributed and 
emerging technologies spur more sustainable growth is 
only possible within a stable framework. 
 Yet given China’s current level of development, sta-
bility means something different today than it did in past 
decades. The discussion of whether communist rule will 
progress in China as it did in the former Eastern-bloc na-
tions has long ended (at least in the West; in Beijing the 
Soviet Union’s demise is still held up as a cautionary 
tale). The question is no longer ascent or collapse, but 
good governance or bad governance. To implement a new 
growth model, businesses need to be sure that political 
conditions are stable, their own investments safe, their 
markets open, their innovations protected and competiti-
ve conditions fair.
 Now, however, two years after Xi’s reform initiative 
was launched, people are much less optimistic. Whe-
ther the topic is the anti-corruption campaign or ma-
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Figure 1: Exports from and imports to the Federal Republic of Germany, 2014
Source: German Federal Statistical Offi ce (DEStatis)
https://www.destatis.de/EN/FactsFigures/NationalEconomyEnvironment/ForeignTrade/TradingPartners/Tables/OrderRankGermanyTradingPartners.pdf?__blob=publicationFile
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5Figure 2: German exports to and imports from Asia
Source: German Federal Statistical Offi ce (DEStatis)
https://www.destatis.de/EN/FactsFigures/NationalEconomyEnvironment/ForeignTrade/TradingPartners/Tables/OrderRankGermanyTradingPartners.pdf?__blob=publicationFile
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of strength have paid off for now. Yet China’s attempts to 
assert itself as a “great power” are causing anxiety. In 
addition to Japan, South Korea and India, the countries 
of Southeast Asia are trying to form alliances that can 
contain Beijing’s influence in the region. The US is a wel-
come protector as they do so. China’s fear of being encir-
cled threatens to become a self-fulfilling prophecy and 
give rise to new confrontations. 
The confidence issue
China and the world are currently undergoing a process 
of disillusionment. The Chinese reforms are stalled or 
are progressing more slowly than many in and outside 
of China had hoped. Such a reality check can certainly 
be healthy. There is little doubt of China’s potential as a 
world power, both economically and politically. Doubts do 
exist, however, about whether the country can make full 
use of that potential.
 China’s leaders will try to give the reforms new mo-
mentum in coming months. The framework for this will be 
the consultations taking place prior to the next five-year 
plan, which is supposed to be approved in the spring. In 
terms of content, however, the plan will adhere to Xi’s 
reform agenda of 2013. Whether or not people continue to 
have confidence in the government will depend, in turn, 
on how the agenda is implemented. 
 Beijing will lower expectations regarding growth ra-
tes, even below the magical 7 percent that was previous-
ly considered the minimum needed to create jobs and 
maintain social stability. China’s slower growth will be 
felt throughout the global economy. For Germany and 
European countries in general, however, the growth rate 
itself is not as decisive as the question of which course 
China takes.
 The signals are contradictory. The reform agenda’s suc-
cess currently seems just as likely as its failure or its 
stagnation in the current state of uncertainty. Germans 
should take each of the possibilities seriously and consi-
der the implications, since there is one thing all the scena-
the stock market. Some 90 million Chinese put their sa-
vings in shares, driving prices to new heights. When the 
bubble burst, it took the state days to prevent a second 
crash, which it succeeded in doing only by spending huge 
amounts of money. The damage to the real economy was 
moderate, since stock markets play only a limited role in 
corporate finance. The political fallout was, however, all 
the greater. The government had long postponed a funda-
mental reform of the financial system, a delay that was 
now coming back to haunt it. When growth rates are fal-
ling there is less leeway for experimenting than in boom 
times – something that also applies to investors’ patience 
and their ability to tolerate losses.
 Foreign companies are also viewing their activities 
in China with increased skepticism. According to the 
most recent Business Confidence Survey conducted by 
the European Chamber of Commerce, just over half of the 
European businesses present in China say they are still 
optimistic. In the prior year’s survey, the figure was 10 
percent higher. The majority of the companies say they are 
unhappy about unfair competitive conditions and disap-
pointed that Xi’s promises to open markets and increase 
competition have not had any impact on them. According 
to European business leaders, the most effective lever 
Beijing has for improving business development is ma-
king the legal system more reliable, since the lack of 
transparent structures is what prevents many firms from 
carrying out more research and development in China. 
Yet promoting innovation and an international transfer 
of know-how is a key prerequisite if a more sustainable 
growth model is to be achieved.
 Beijing’s behavior on the international stage is also 
causing concern. By adding land to islands in the South 
China Sea, the country has reversed the strategy it pur-
sued for many years, namely doing as little as possible to 
stir up controversy when it comes to territorial rights, 
in order to maintain good relations with its neighbors. 
Beijing’s bet that neither the countries bordering the is-
lands nor the United States would interfere with this show 
7rios have in common: The framework for economic and 
political cooperation will become more difficult.
 Until now Germany has benefitted from a special re-
lationship with China. There is no other major developed 
country with which Beijing works as closely and trusting-
ly. The German government is also the only one that 
holds joint cabinet meetings with its Chinese counter-
part. This special relationship is extremely valuable and 
should continue to be promoted, since the German busi-
ness community can use any diplomatic backing it gets, 
and the relationship offers German policymakers the op-
portunity to include China in the international communi-
ty to a greater degree. 
 At the same time, Germany should not rely too hea-
vily on the singular access it enjoys. Should China conti-
nue to develop successfully, it could give Germany less 
attention politically than in the past and the countries’ 
economic relations would be subject to greater competiti-
on. As Beijing’s economic plans make plain, China wants 
to become a serious competitor in all major technology 
sectors. Should China fall into crisis, however, then the 
German-Sino relationship would also suffer. Companies 
and politicians should therefore take advantage of the 
current period of transformation to re-examine their en-
gagement in China and diversify their activities in Asia.
 Planning according to different scenarios requires po-
licymakers and the business community to do one thing 
without disregarding another. It also draws attention to a 
fundamental truth: Germany’s role in global politics stands 
and falls with the power of Europe, just as Germany’s role 
as an economic power hinges on the ability of its busines-
ses and research institutes to innovate and remain compe-
titive. As always, the most important tasks are waiting at 
home. 
China’s significance for
the world economy
China now has the second largest economy in the 
world, measured in current US dollars. The Interna-
tional Monetary Fund (IMF) estimates China’s GDP 
in 2015 to be $11.2 trillion (US: $18.1 trillion; Euro-
pean Union: $16.4 trillion).
According to the IMF, the Chinese economy has 
been the world’s largest since 2014 when measured 
in terms of purchasing power. In 2014, Chinese GDP 
was $17.6 trillion valued at purchasing power parity 
(US: $17.4 trillion, EU: $18.5 trillion).
China is one of the world’s most important export 
markets. In 2014, it imported goods worth $1.96 
trillion (US: $2.41 trillion, Germany: $1.22 trillion).  
In 2014, China exported $2.34 trillion in goods. That 
means the country has an enormous trade surplus, 
which has resulted in signifi cant foreign currency re-
serves. In July 2015, they amounted to $3.65 trillion.
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